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I. INTRODUCTION 
The links between trade and the environment are complex and 
multifaceted.
1
 The relationship between international trade and the 
environment has only recently attained a prominent place in the trade 
agenda, although it has been a concern of environmentalists for some 
 
 
  J.S.D. Candidate (2011), University of Dalhousie; LL.M. (2008), University of Calgary. 
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time.
2
 In the aftermath of the Rio Declaration
3
 and with the advent in the 
1990s of some disputes touching on trade and the environment, 
environmentalists demanded a restraint on the pursuit of free trade. While 
some environmentalists tend to identify liberal trade with environmentally 
destructive, unrestrained economic growth, many free traders label states‘ 
resort to environmentally motivated unilateral trade measures as either 
―disguised protectionism‖ or ―irrational fanaticism.‖4  
By coupling trade with the environment in environmentally motivated 
unilateral trade measures, the World Trade Organization (―WTO‖) causes 
disagreements between countries in different stages of development. The 
members of developing countries and economies in transition voice 
concern over the proclivity of high-income countries to use unilateral trade 
measures to induce or threaten less wealthy countries to implement 
discriminatory environmental regulations in favor of high-income 
countries; they challenge the legality of such measures under the WTO 
rules. Against this background, the WTO initiated negotiations and 
discussions on important aspects of the linkages between trade and the 
environment—one such discussion focuses on clarifying the status of 
unilateral trade measures that are taken on environmental grounds.
5
  
Both before and after the initiation of these negotiations and 
discussions, WTO Members propagated different approaches to resolve 
the conflict between trade and the environment. Two major approaches 
dominate the discussions and negotiations for the clarification of the status 
of environmentally motivated trade measures in the WTO: the status quo 
approach, the proponents of which argue that unilateral trade measures are 
already recognized by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(―GATT‖) system, and thus there is no need for further progress on the 
issue;
6
 and the environmental integrative approach, the proponents of 
which insist that the rules are not broad enough to accommodate 
 
 
 2. Id. at 331. 
 3. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I) (Annex I) 
(June 13, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. 
 4. TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 1, at 507. 
 5. The Doha Declaration, a document agreed upon by the trade ministers of the Member 
countries of the World Trade Organization, mandates the Committee on Trade and Environment to 
start negotiation on: (a) the relationship between WTO rules and specific trade obligations in 
Multilateral Environment Agreements (―MEAs‖); (b) reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
environmental goods and services; and (c) the procedure for information exchange between the 
Secretariats of MEAs and WTO Committees. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 
November 2001, ¶¶ 32, 33, 51, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746, 751 (2002) [hereinafter Doha 
Declaration]. 
 6. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
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environmental values, and thus propose various mechanisms to govern the 
overall relationship of trade rules with environmental rules.
7
  
These approaches contain a number of drawbacks that hindered the 
consensus required for clarifying the status of environmentally motivated 
trade measures in the WTO. Most of the proposals do not seem well suited 
to address the concern of low-income countries, which by far constitute 
the majority of WTO Members.
8
 This Article analyzes and critically 
examines the various approaches to resolving the trade and environment 
conflict in the WTO, with specific regard to the regulation of unilateral 
trade measures. Part II describes the various approaches by WTO 
Members to the reconciliation of the two regimes. Part III discusses the 
responses to the various approaches. An appraisal is made from the 
perspective adopted by the paper in Parts IV through VI, and finally 
conclusions are drawn. 
II. APPROACHES TO CLARIFYING ENVIRONMENTALLY MOTIVATED TRADE 
MEASURES IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION  
After the launch of the Doha round of negotiations in 2001, there was a 
large influx of proposals addressing the issue of trade measures for 
environmental purposes. The proposals, submitted by Member states both 
prior to and after the Doha round, can broadly be grouped into two 
approaches: the ―status quo approach‖ and the ―environmental integrative 
approach.‖ The former focuses on how trade measures should be placed at 
the service of environmental goals—as, for example, in the U.S. push for 
language ensuring the continued use of unilateral trade measures as an 
effective tool for environmental protection.
9
 The environmental integrative 
approach, while accommodating legitimate environmental concerns, 
strongly opposes the unilateral use of environmentally motivated trade 
measures as a pretext for disguised protectionism or extra-jurisdictional 
application of environmental laws. Rapprochement between the two 
approaches appears unlikely.  
 
 
 7. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 8. See WTO, Understanding the WTO: The Organization-Members and Observers, http://www. 
wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2010). 
 9. See infra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Status Quo Approach to Trade Measures in the World Trade 
Organization 
The proponents of the status quo approach assail motions towards a 
link between trade and the environment beyond what is already provided 
under article XX of GATT.
10
 They believe that there are already adequate 
provisions in the WTO dealing with unilateral trade measures for 
environmental purposes. ―Interestingly, these countries include those who 
believe that the WTO rules are clear in sanctioning many such measures 
(e.g. the United States) as well as those who believe the rules are clear in 
prohibiting them (e.g. India).‖11 The former group of countries proposed 
that environmental and trade policies in the WTO should continue with the 
existing, but strengthened, relationship. They thus advocated for a state‘s 
right to use trade measures for environmental purposes within the existing 
GATT framework.  
Maintaining the status quo between Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements (―MEAs‖) and WTO rules under this approach is built on the 
premise that only a small number of MEAs contain trade measures, and 
that so far there has not been any conflict between MEAs and the WTO.
12
 
Moreover, the proponents of the status quo approach frequently emphasize 
that article XX of GATT provides a wide scope of environmental 
exceptions, and that WTO rules incorporate the concept of sustainable 
development and form the environmental foundation of some WTO 
decisions. 
According to the United States, the leading proponent of this approach, 
the MEA–WTO relationship has worked and continues to work ―quite 
well.‖13 The WTO rules have not interfered with trade obligations among 
MEA parties, nor have they stifled MEA negotiators‘ willingness to 
include trade obligations that are deemed important for environmental 
purposes. ―For their part, MEA negotiators have generally sought to tailor 
their trade provisions to meet particular environmental purposes . . . in a 
 
 
 10. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
 11. Alexey Vikhlyaev, The Use of Trade Measures for Environmental Purposes—Globally and 
in the EU Context 18 (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Note di Lavoro No. 68.2001, 2001), available at 
http://www.feem.it/userfiles/attach/Publication/NDL2001/NDL2001-068.pdf. 
 12. Risa Schwartz, Trade Measures Pursuant to Multilateral Environmental Agreements—
Developments from Singapore to Seattle, 9 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT‘L ENVTL. LAW 43, 43 
(2000). 
 13. Special Session of the Comm. on Trade & Env., Sub-Paragraph 31(I) of the Doha 
Declaration: Submission by the United States, ¶ 5, TN/TE/W/20 (Feb. 10, 2003). 
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way that takes account of WTO implications.‖14 In its submissions to the 
Committee on Trade and Environment (―CTE‖) in June 2004, the United 
States stressed the critical importance of enhanced domestic coordination 
between MEA and WTO policymakers and negotiators, and contended 
that both the design of the Specific Trade Obligations (―STOs‖) in MEAs 
and the implementation practice of MEA Parties could contribute to a 
―mutually supportive relationship‖ between trade and the environment.15  
This proposal was first introduced to the CTE in 1996, and the United 
States has pursued it strongly throughout the post-Doha negotiations. The 
Singapore Report echoed in its recommendations some elements of the 
status quo approach and, thus, MEA negotiators have been invited to the 
CTE to give presentations on new trade-related developments in their 
respective agreements.
16
 
B. The Environmental Integrative Approach 
The environmental integrative approach calls for the integration of 
environmentally motivated measures into trade agreements and for the 
enunciation of detailed environmental exceptions. Unlike the status quo 
approach, the environmental integrative approach is based on the premise 
that article XX does not permit unilateral trade measures to address extra-
jurisdictional environmental problems.
17
 Therefore, the WTO must 
approve a state‘s protection of the environment beyond its own territory. 
The proposals made before the CTE under this category have generally 
taken either ex post or ex ante approaches to the application of 
environmental exceptions under the WTO rules. The following discussion 
considers such proposals in more detail.  
1. The Ex Post (Waivers) Approach 
This proposal attempts to resolve the trade and environment policy 
conflict through the waiver provisions of the WTO rules, i.e., the ex post 
 
 
 14. Id.  
 15. Special Session of the Comm. on Trade & Env., Sub-Paragraph 31(I) of the Doha 
Declaration: Submission by the United States, ¶ 6, TN/TE/W/40 (June 21, 2004) [hereinafter 2004 
Submission by the U.S.]. It argued that improved designs of Specific Trade Obligations in MEAs based 
on science, revisions in light of new data, and flexibilities in implementation can enhance the mutual 
support of the two regimes. It also proposed that MEAs must be designed and implemented in such a 
way as to enlist countries‘ maximum participation. Regarding the design, the package of measures 
must contain trade measures, production and consumption regulations and positive measures. 
 16. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 67. 
 17. Vikhlyaev, supra note 11, at 25. 
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means available under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. This 
approach, as proposed by the EU, asserts that trade measures arising from 
MEAs may be accepted by the WTO ―either on a case-by-case basis or 
automatically‖ through the waiver provisions in the WTO.18 In practice 
this means that trade measures arising from MEAs might be specially 
exempted from WTO rules by means of a waiver under either articles 
IX(3) and (4) of the Marrakesh Agreement that establishes the WTO,
19
 or 
article XXV(5) of GATT.
20
 Such an exemption runs for a limited period of 
time and must be reviewed within one year.
21
  
Another aspect of the waiver approach, adopted by the Ministerial 
Conference in Singapore, provides that WTO Members, which are also 
parties to MEAs, can resolve disputes over the use of trade measures 
applied among themselves pursuant to the dispute settlement mechanism 
available under the appropriate MEA.
22
 This view is based on the 
presumption that MEAs that have a broad multilateral consensus would 
also enjoy wide support from the international community, including 
WTO Members.
23
 This international consensus would help to establish the 
merits for granting a waiver to the proposed MEA. 
A related proposal by the EU suggests the possible use of an ex post 
waiver under the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, through a reversal of the 
burden of proof when a non-party to an MEA challenges a measure taken 
by another WTO Member pursuant to that MEA.
24
  
At the moment, the onus falls on a WTO Member defending a 
measure under GATT Article XX to prove that the measure, if 
deemed incompatible with other GATT provisions, nevertheless 
meets the requirements laid down in Article XX. The reversal of the 
burden of proof would [mean] that the country challenging the 
 
 
 18. ―The criteria proposed for trade measures to support environmental objectives include such 
notions as necessity, proportionality, least-trade restrictiveness, effectiveness, broad multilateral 
support, and adequate scientific evidence.‖ Id. at 18.  
 19. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. 
 20. These provisions allow the WTO Ministerial Conference, by a three-quarters or two-thirds 
majority, to release a Member from contractual obligations under exceptional circumstances. See id. 
art. IX(3)–(4); GATT, supra note 10, art. XXV(5). 
 21. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 19, art. IX(4). 
 22. Comm. on Trade & Env., Report (1996) of the Committee on Trade and Environment, ¶ 38, 
WT/CTE/1 (Nov. 12, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 WTO Committee Report]. 
 23. Vikhlyaev, supra note 11, at 18. 
 24. Comm. on Trade & Env., Resolving the Relationship Between WTO Rules and Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements: Submission by the European Community, ¶ 15, WT/CTE/W/170 (Oct. 19, 
2000) [hereinafter Submission by the E.C.]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss3/3
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measure would . . . have to prove the measures imposed by the other 
party do not meet the conditions of Article XX.
25
  
The EU argued that this approach ―provide[s] greater security without 
altering the rights and obligations of WTO Members,‖ and also addresses 
the specific issue of non-parties.
26
  
―The waiver approach was not considered to be the optimal solution by 
some WTO Members as waivers are time-limited, leaving MEA 
negotiators in a state of uncertainty as to the situation after the expiry.‖27 
Moreover, granting a waiver to an obligation under the WTO rules can 
only be done through a two-thirds majority—a number considered too 
difficult to achieve for every waiver request. As a result, some delegations 
felt ―that obtaining a waiver could be time-consuming and possibly 
cumbersome.‖28 
It has also ―been noted [by some writers] that Article XXV is meant to 
address exceptional circumstances and it is not clear [whether the WTO] 
would wish to treat MEAs as exceptions.‖29 Therefore, as suggested by 
Risa Schwartz, the waivers approach may be an unsatisfactory resolution 
of the relationship between WTO rules and environmental policies.
30
  
Owing to these doubts—as well as the contention by some Members 
that the proposals are outside the Doha Declaration in paragraphs 31(i) and 
32—the ex post proposals have been largely omitted from the discussions 
following the launch of the Doha round of negotiations.
31
 After the 
Declaration of the Doha Agenda, discussions and proposals mostly 
focused on the ex ante approaches.  
 
 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. ¶ 10. 
 27. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 66. 
 28. Ambassador H. Ukawa (Japan), Chairman of the Group on Environmental Measures and 
International Contracting Parties, Report to the 49th Session of the Contracting Parties, ¶ 23, L/7402 
(Feb. 2, 1994). 
 29. Id.  
 30. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 66.  
 31. The United States, for example, has argued that these proposals tend to add burdens on WTO 
Member states on top of those recognized under existing WTO agreements. This would contravene 
paragraph 32 of the Doha Declaration (also referred to as the Doha agenda or Doha mandate), which 
provides that ―the negotiations must not add to or diminish the rights and obligations of Members 
under existing WTO agreements.‖ See 2004 Submission by the U.S., supra note 15, ¶ 4.  
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2. The Ex Ante (Environmental Window) Approach 
A second approach advanced by some WTO Members, mainly the EU, 
is described as creating an ―environmental window‖ in GATT.32 This 
involves defining the conditions for the use of trade measures in the 
context of an MEA—conditions, which, as long as they were met, would 
ensure GATT accommodation of the measures.  
Although many European and other developed-country WTO Members 
supported clarifying the relationship in this way, the various proposals 
differed drastically so that there was no common agreement about which 
was the preferred method: an amendment of the GATT provisions or an 
independent instrument of understanding for the clarification of the 
existing rules.
33
 The proponents of the ex ante approach argue that greater 
certainty is needed on the use of unilateral trade measures in the WTO and 
that the waiver approach fails to provide this certainty. Hence, they 
propose to clarify the relationship between the WTO and MEAs through 
an amendment to article XX so as to accommodate the use of trade 
measures pursuant to MEAs—the EU‘s original proposal before the first 
WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 1996
34—or through a 
negotiated interpretation or understanding of article XX as suggested by 
Switzerland and the EU in the post-Doha negotiations.
35
 Some writers 
have also argued that clarifying the WTO-MEA relationship and accepting 
the legitimate use of trade measures in MEAs would send a message that, 
while these MEA-based trade measures may be acceptable under article 
XX, unilateral actions are not welcome in the multilateral trading system.
36
  
A version of this approach that has gained much support among WTO 
Members involves a collective interpretation of the applicability of the 
provisions of article XX of GATT in circumstances where trade measures 
 
 
 32. 1996 WTO Committee Report, supra note 22, ¶ 15. 
 33. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 66. 
 34. It is important to note that a similar provision has been included in article 103 of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (―NAFTA‖), where in cases of conflict between itself and the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, the Montreal 
Protocol, or the Basel Convention, the MEA provision takes precedence, subject to the parties using 
the means least inconsistent with NAFTA in the MEA‘s implementation. See North American Free 
Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 104, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter 
NAFTA]. 
 35. Special Session of the Comm. on Trade & Env., Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
(MEAS): Implementation of the Doha Development Agenda: Submission by the European 
Communities, ¶ 30, TN/TE/W/1 (Mar. 21, 2002) [hereinafter Doha Development: European 
Submission].  
 36. Sabrina Shaw & Risa Schwartz, Trade and Environment in the WTO: State of Play, 36 J. 
WORLD TRADE 105, 148 (2002). 
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in an MEA are applied to non-parties.
37
 There have also been discussions 
about whether this should be done by expanding subsection (b), (g) or (h) 
of article XX, or whether it would be preferable to add a new subsection 
(k).
38
  
The European Union supported the collective interpretation technique 
because it believed that this ―would provide gains to all WTO members 
and contracting parties to MEAs, provide greater legal security, make both 
systems more effective and improve policy formulation in both areas.‖39 
The EU‘s position was that WTO rules should not be interpreted in 
―clinical isolation‖ from other bodies of international law, including 
MEAs. MEAs would therefore have considerable relevance for the 
application of WTO rules in a particular dispute, even in relation to non-
parties.
40
 The EU cited the WTO Appellate Body‘s reference in the 
Shrimp-Turtle case
41
 to a number of MEAs and its clarification of the term 
―exhaustible natural resources‖ under article XX(g) of GATT in support of 
the conclusion that MEAs have a significant role in justifying trade 
measures taken for environmental purposes.
42
 
The European Union also suggested some principles that should govern 
the relationship between MEAs and WTO rules.
43
 Switzerland went 
considerably further by proposing a ―coherence clause,‖ according to 
which the provisions of an MEA would have to be treated equally to those 
of the WTO in the event of a dispute.
44
 
 
 
 37. Submission by the E.C., supra note 24, ¶ 24. 
 38. Tilman Santarius et al., Balancing Trade and Environment 8 (Wuppertal Inst. for Climate, 
Env., and Energy, Wuppertal Paper No. 133e, 2004), available at http://www.wupperinst.org/en/ 
publications/entnd/uploads/tx_wibeitrag/WP133e.pdf.  
 39. U. Sankar, Trade Measures in Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the WTO Rules 
12 (Dec. 2007) (unpublished report, presented at the International Society of Ecological Economics 
Conference, New Delhi, Dec. 15–18, 2007), available at http://www.mse.ac.in/Trade%20Measures. 
pdf. 
 40. Doha Development: European Submission, supra note 35, ¶ 29.  
 41. See infra note 87.  
 42. The European Union noted that ―jurisprudence of the Appellate Body in environment-related 
cases strongly suggests that the conclusion of an MEA could well be a key element to determine the 
justification of certain measures under Article XX of the GATT.‖ Doha Development: European 
Submission, supra note 35, ¶ 29. The EU also reiterated the Appellate Body‘s decision that the GATT 
rules ―must be read by a Treaty interpreter in the light of contemporary concerns of the Community of 
nations about the protection and conservation of the environment.‖ Appellate Body Report, United 
States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Complaint by India, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Thailand), ¶ 129, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle case]. 
 43. It suggested the implementation in the WTO of principles of: (1) mutual supportiveness, (2) 
no subordination, (3) deference, and (4) transparency. Special Session of the Comm. on Trade & Env., 
Proposal for a Decision of the Ministerial Conference on Trade and Environment: Submission by the 
European Communities, ¶ 2, TN/TE/W/68 (June 30, 2006). 
 44. 1996 WTO Committee Report, supra note 22, ¶ 19. 
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Doubts have been raised about the ex ante approach generally. It has 
been argued, for example, that the approach could upset the existing 
balance of GATT rights and obligations. WTO Members that are not party 
to many MEAs, such as the United States, wish to invoke their GATT 
rights if they believe they are suffering from unfair trade practices or 
unnecessary discrimination. They, therefore, insist that the provisions of 
an MEA, or the judgments of parties to an MEA, should not be allowed to 
override those GATT rights, especially without any obligation to explain 
the case for trade discrimination if the measure is challenged under 
GATT.
45
  
Another basic doubt of a more practical nature is whether it would be 
possible to find a single formula for implementing the approach that 
would, on the one hand, be general enough to encompass all legitimate 
requirements—present and future—for the use of trade measures in the 
context of MEAs and, on the other, neither over-stretch the basic concept 
of an exception clause which underlies this approach nor open the door to 
protectionist abuse.
46
 Also, some commentators express the concern that it 
may be difficult to establish criteria for implementing this approach 
without stepping outside the competence of the GATT agreement and 
entering into an examination of the environmental justification for the use 
of trade provisions in an MEA. Such writers, therefore, recommend 
consideration of the individual merits of each case as it arises rather than 
pursuing concepts of general application.
47
  
3. The Principles and Criteria Approach 
The ―principles and criteria approach‖ has been advanced by Canada 
since June 1996 and throughout the Doha round of negotiations.
48
 This 
approach takes an ex ante form. As the Canadian trade representative 
stated, the approach emanated from the formulation of Canada‘s national 
position for MEA negotiations.
49
  
The ―principles and criteria approach‖ attempts to clarify the existing 
WTO rules, possibly ―in some form of interpretative or ministerial 
statement [which can assist] WTO panels in assessing the legitimacy of 
 
 
 45. Report to the 49th Session of the Contracting Parties, supra note 28, ¶ 26. 
 46. Id. This is a concern raised by most developing countries, which are afraid that most MEAs 
have been negotiated through the coercive actions of powerful nations.  
 47. Id.  
 48. Special Session of the Comm. on Trade & Env., Summary Report on the Eleventh Meeting of 
the Committee on Trade and Environment in Special Session, ¶ 4, TN/TE/R/11 (May 30, 2005). 
 49. Id. ¶ 3. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss3/3
  
 
 
 
 
2010] THE WAY FORWARD 437 
 
 
 
 
MEA trade measures and international MEA negotiators in contemplating 
the appropriate use of trade measures.‖50 According to this approach, 
principles specify the requirements for the acceptability of MEAs and 
specific trade measures, while criteria determine how the trade measure is 
applied.
51
 In this way, ―Canada believes that a balanced outcome in the 
WTO negotiations could have the effect of facilitating the negotiation of 
trade measures within MEAs that take account of WTO rules and 
contribute to environmental protection.‖52 
This approach looks to ―MEA qualifying principles and criteria for 
determining the need for trade provisions in MEAs.‖53 More significantly, 
the proposal also provides that other principles and criteria could be added 
―so that context of a particular trade agreement is accounted for such as 
scenarios where almost every negotiating party is a developing country.‖54 
C. Other Approaches in the World Trade Organization 
Although the above approaches are the major proposals that have been 
advanced in the discussions and negotiations on the trade and environment 
agenda, there are also other proposals that incorporate elements of one or 
more of the approaches discussed. For example, taking a tack similar to 
Canada‘s, Switzerland proposed an interpretative understanding that 
would ensure that MEAs determine the objectives, proportionality, and 
necessity of trade measures while the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
would have the authority to assess whether a particular trade measure is 
 
 
 50. General Council, Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference: Canadian Approach to 
Trade and Environment in the New WTO Round, ¶ 6, WT/GC/W/358 (Oct. 12, 1999). 
 51. The qualifying principles include the MEA: ―(1) being open to all countries; (2) reflecting 
broad-based international support; (3) precisely drafting those provisions that specifically authorize 
trade measures; [and] (4) permitting trade with non-parties on the same basis as parties, when non-
parties provide equivalent environmental protection.‖ Special Session of the Comm. on Trade & Env., 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and WTO Rules; Proposals Made in the Committee 
on Trade and Environment (CTE) from 1995–2002, at 13, TN/TE/S/1 (May 23, 2002) [hereinafter 
MEAs and WTO Rules Proposals]. 
 52. Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Trade & Environment at the WTO, http:// 
www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/env/t-e_wto.aspx?lang=en&menu_id 
=5&menu=R (last visited Sept. 22, 2009). 
 53. Kevin R. Gray, Accommodating MEAs in Trade Agreements 8 (paper presented at the 
International Environmental Governance Conference, Paris, Mar. 15–16, 2004), available at 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/graymea.pdf. In this context Gray proposed the additional 
requirement that ―the MEA must make appropriate provision to facilitate implementation by 
developing country parties to the agreement (i.e., technology transfer, capacity building) and otherwise 
give effect to the common but differential responsibilities principle.‖ Id. at 9.  
 54. Id.  
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applied in an arbitrary, discriminatory, or protectionist manner.
55
 The 
responsibility for setting the principles is thus assigned to the 
environmental regime, while the criteria of their application are left to the 
trade regime. Switzerland considered four options for regulating the issue 
of trade measures in MEAs:  
i. Leave the issue to be settled by the dispute settlement 
mechanism of the WTO. 
ii. Amend article XX(g) of GATT by introducing a reference to the 
environment. 
iii. Reverse the burden of proof. 
iv. Adopt an interpretative decision on article XX.
56
  
Other positions vary between a mixture of status quo, ex post, and ex 
ante approaches with strict criteria,
57
 such as: (i) the Korean approach 
indicating that any trade measure not specifically mandated in an MEA 
should be treated as a unilateral trade measure;
58
 and (ii) the Japanese 
proposal to establish procedural guidelines for MEA negotiators on the 
WTO-consistency of various trade measures.
59
  
So far, it has been difficult to find common ground among all the 
approaches suggested. The proposals have encountered sharp criticism 
from WTO Member states, which either have advanced their own 
approach or opposed discussions and negotiations on the agenda at all. 
 
 
 55. Comm. on Trade & Env., The Relationship Between the Provisions of the Multilateral 
Trading System and Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs): Submission by Switzerland, ¶ 7, 
WT/CTE/W/139 (June 8, 2000). 
 56. Special Session of the Comm. on Trade & Env., Statement by Switzerland at the CTE Special 
Session on 10 October 2002, at 3, TN/TE/W/16 (Nov. 6, 2002). Regarding option (i), Switzerland 
noted that the Appellate Body‘s decisions determined only the legal situation of a specific case in 
relation to two members, but that it did not constitute a general rule for the relationship between the 
WTO and MEAs. Id. ¶ 11. Regarding option (ii), it wanted an environmental clause that would 
explicitly define the relationship between WTO rules and MEAs. Id. Regarding option (iii), it stated 
that when a Member, pursuant to an MEA, prohibits the marketing of a product for environmental 
reasons, such a ban is considered to be WTO-consistent and the Member would no longer have to 
show that its measure was covered by the exceptions under article XX(b). Id. at 3. With regard to 
option (iv), its view was that it neither added to nor diminished the rights and obligations of members, 
but simply clarified the texts. Id. ¶ 9. See also Special Session of the Comm. on Trade & Env., 
Submission by Switzerland: The Relationship Between Existing WTO Rules and Specific Trade 
Obligations (STOs) Set Out in Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs): A Swiss Perspective 
on National Experiences and Criteria Used in the Negotiation and Implementation of MEAs, 
TN/TE/W/58 (July 6, 2005). 
 57. See generally Santarius et al., supra note 38 (outlining other approaches). 
 58. MEAs and WTO Rules Proposals, supra note 51, at 9–10. 
 59. Id. at 14–15. 
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Some countries are concerned that the window approach would set 
dangerous precedents for other social issues—such as labor and 
indigenous rights—and open the WTO to protectionism. The waiver 
approach has been criticized for failing to provide certainty and guidance 
to MEA negotiators. 
Both the waiver approach and the principles and criteria approach have 
been branded as an opportunity for trade policymakers to pass judgment 
on international environmental law.
60
 Most developing countries are 
totally opposed to any move to incorporate environmental policies in the 
WTO through unilateral action and, in particular, have raised serious 
objections to the view that the existing WTO rules already have room 
available for unilaterally imposed trade measures. These developing 
countries are wary of the unilateral imposition of protectionist trade 
measures by the well muscled Member states in pursuit of their own 
economic interests. In the following pages I will discuss suggestions made 
outside the WTO framework before pointing to the notable arguments and 
counter-proposals of WTO Members in response to the approaches 
discussed.  
III. ALTERNATIVES OUTSIDE THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
FRAMEWORK: THE INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
STANDARDS  
Numerous reform proposals have been suggested outside the 
framework of the WTO. The ―integrated assessment approach‖ is one 
proposal in particular that merits discussion due to the support it attracts 
amongst writers and the significance it may have in contributing to the 
clarification of the status of unilateral trade measures taken on 
environmental grounds.  
The ―integrated assessment approach,‖ as proposed and explained by 
experts on trade and the environment from the United Nations 
Environment Program (―UNEP‖), ―considers the economic, environmental 
and social effects of trade measures, the linkages between these effects, 
and aims to build upon this analysis by identifying ways in which . . . 
positive effects can be enhanced.‖61 The approach has both ex post and ex 
 
 
 60. This critique has its basis in the fact that some MEAs are older and have more members than 
the WTO. Int‘l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., Legal and Policy Linkages: MEAs and the WTO, http:// 
www.iisd.org/trade/handbook/5_10.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2009). 
 61. U.N. Env. Prog. [UNEP], Reference Manual for the Integrated Assessment of Trade-Related 
Policies, at iii, UNEP/01/4 (2001), available at http://www.unep.ch/etb/publications/intAssessment/ 
refmaniaFinal.pdf.  
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ante applications. The ex post application aims to articulate standards that 
will help policymakers and stakeholders judge the results of trade 
measures that have already been introduced, while the ex ante assessment 
contributes to the process of developing policy prior to the start of formal 
international negotiations.
62
  
Although the harmonization of environmental standards has been 
supported by many writers, there remains conflict as to which body should 
be given the responsibility for assessing the standards so designed: the 
WTO, environmental organizations such as the UNEP, or an independent 
organization established for this purpose. Some writers have argued that 
the WTO dispute resolution system is ill equipped to take into account 
factors outside the ―four corners‖ of the WTO, and therefore 
environmental experts should be included in the system in all cases 
involving environmental concerns.
63
  
While this would theoretically be possible in the WTO, other writers 
express the concern that GATT or the WTO may well not permit GATT 
Panels to take into account environmental concerns outside of GATT, 
―rendering the presence of the environmental expert all but useless.‖64 
Hence, they argue for an objective body that would be better able to 
accommodate the concerns of both regimes as to the application of the 
harmonized standards. Their proposal is either to strengthen the UNEP or 
create a separate Global Environmental Organization as a counterpoise to 
the WTO.
65
 Such an organ, as proposed by Charles Cowan, would take the 
form of an objective third body likely established under the umbrella of 
the United Nations, which involves experts of both trade and the 
environment.
66
  
This approach, though it dominates the literature on the subject, has not 
yet been officially introduced in the CTE discussions. Hence, it has little 
or no role in the discussions and negotiations carried out in the Committee 
on Trade and Environment Special Session (―CTESS‖). As such, this 
Article will not explore the proposal further.  
 
 
 62. Id. at 15. 
 63. Claire R. Kelly, Power, Linkage and Accommodation: The WTO as an International Actor 
and Its Influence on Other Actors and Regimes, 24 BERKELEY J. INT‘L L. 79, 101–02 (2006). 
 64. Charles Cowan, Separate Spheres: Conflict and Congruence between International Trade 
and Environmental Law, 61 J.L. & POL‘Y (Japan) 1336, 1307 (1995). 
 65. UNEP, supra note 61. 
 66. Cowan, supra note 64, at 1307. 
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IV. UNILATERALISM AND THE THREAT OF GREEN PROTECTIONISM 
The position of WTO Members that are developing economies and 
economies in transition on the agenda for the clarification of the legality of 
unilateral trade measures in the WTO is formed more as a response than a 
distinct approach per se. From an early point, most developing countries 
opposed environmental discussions in the WTO. For example, they 
opposed the convening of the Environmental Measures and International 
Trade (―EMIT‖) group and the formation of the CTE precisely because 
they feared these entities could be used to justify U.S. and European 
unilateral trade measures against exports from developing countries, 
resulting in ―green protectionism.‖67 In the GATT Council meetings 
building up to the EMIT group‘s convening, the Thai representative, on 
behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (―ASEAN‖), 
asserted that ―for GATT to address environmental [protection] problems 
as a general trade policy issue was inappropriate.‖68 The Moroccan 
delegate expressed no definitive views on whether GATT had the 
―competence to legislate on this subject.‖69 The Egyptian delegate 
concurred that GATT ―was not the forum to deal with this matter.‖70  
Sequential to the inflow of proposals into the WTO, critics both in the 
North and South began to voice their concern that the initiatives for 
environmental reform in the WTO might open a venue for protectionism.
71
 
Some object that ―even without the ‗new issues‘, the present agenda of the 
WTO is very full and indeed already overloaded.‖72 Most of the 
 
 
 67. Gregory C. Shaffer, The Nexus of Law and Politics: The WTO’s Committee on Trade and 
Environment, in THE GREENING OF TRADE LAW 85 (Richard H. Steinberg ed., 2002). 
 68. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 6 February 
1991, at 22, C/M/247 (Mar. 5, 1991) [hereinafter Feb. 1991 GATT Meeting Minutes]. The members of 
ASEAN within the WTO at the time were Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand. See, WTO, Understanding the WTO: The Organization—Members, Observers, http://www. 
wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2010); ASEAN, About 
ASEAN: Overview, http://www.aseansec.org/about_ASEAN.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2010). 
 69. Feb. 1991 GATT Meeting Minutes, supra note 68, at 25. 
 70. Id. at 26.  
 71. The term ―South‖ refers to biodiversity-rich but economically disadvantaged countries of 
Africa, Asia (excluding Japan), Latin America, and Oceania. See Nassau A. Adams, WORLDS APART: 
THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 5 (2d ed. 1993). 
 72. Third World Network, The WTO, the Post-Doha Agenda and the Future of the Trade System: 
A Development Perspective 22 (paper presented at the Asian Development Bank‘s Annual Meeting, 
Shanghai, China, May 10, 2002), available at http://www.networkideas.org/featart/may2002/ 
Post_Doha_Agenda.pdf. In addition to the ―new issues,‖ such as various environmental initiatives 
pursuant to the Doha Declaration, the critics argue that the WTO already has a full agenda, which 
includes 
implementation issues, the built-in agenda of agriculture and services negotiations and the 
mandated reviews of the TRIPS [Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights] and 
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developing countries contend that introducing environmental issues into 
the WTO would distract the WTO from its work on trade and other 
existing issues.
73
 Because developing countries do not have the manpower 
and financial resources to cope with negotiations on new issues in addition 
to other items on the Doha agenda, they argue that the WTO should only 
address trade issues legitimately tied to multilateral trade rules. Further, 
these rules and the system ought to be designed to benefit developing 
countries, which form the majority of the WTO membership.
74
  
A related ground for resisting discussion on the accommodation of 
environmental policies in the WTO stems from the need to re-think trade 
liberalization and re-orient the WTO towards development objectives. 
Developing countries and their supporters argue that introducing ―new 
issues‖ into the WTO would be counterproductive as it would further 
burden the developing countries with inappropriate obligations, causing 
greater imbalance in the system, even before reforms reflecting 
development objectives are implemented.
75
 Developing countries are also 
apprehensive of the potential use of environmentally motivated trade 
measures as non-tariff barriers. At the GATT Marrakesh Ministerial 
Meeting in April 1994, for example, Dato‘ Seri Rafidah Aziz, the 
Malaysian Minister of International Trade and Industry, stated that 
environmental issues ―are now clearly being used to promote protectionist 
motives, particularly to keep out imports from countries which have a 
better competitive edge and comparative advantage.‖76 As far as the 
accommodation of environmental issues in the WTO is concerned, for 
inventions based on biological resources and traditional knowledge, for 
example, most developing countries want no more than an amendment to 
 
 
TRIMS [Trade Related Investment Measures] Agreements, the many other items of the post-
Doha programme and the routine work of the many committees, the trade reviews, and the 
dispute cases. 
Id. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Dato Azmi Khalid, Minister of Rural Dev., Malay., Statement at the International Conference 
on Financing for Development (Mar. 22, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/ffd/statements/ 
malaysiaE.htm. 
 75. For example, Jagdish Bhagwati, a prominent figure representing the position of developing 
countries in the trade and environment debate and a former adviser to the U.N. on globalization, argues 
that trade instruments are not ideal instruments to achieve the goals of MEAs. He asserts: ―we need to 
recognize and proactively pursue the numerous possibilities of fashioning alternative policies that are 
more cost-effective than burdening trade treaties and negotiations with social agendas as preconditions 
for the freeing of trade.‖ Jagdish Bhagwati, On Thinking Clearly about the Linkage between Trade and 
the Environment, 5 ENV‘T & DEV. ECON. 485, 495 (2000). 
 76. Trade Negotiations Comm., Malaysia: Statement by Dato’ Seri Rafidah Aziz, Minister of 
International Trade and Industry, at 2, MTN.TNC/MIN(94)/ST/41 (Apr. 13, 1994). 
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the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(―TRIPS‖) that incorporates benefit-sharing obligations from the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (―CBD‖).77 They recognize that the 
international economic and financial crisis of the early 1990s appears to 
have induced renewed recourse to protectionism and unilateral measures, 
including measures taken under the guise of environmental objectives.
78
 
Hence, developing countries and their supporters insist that proposals for 
the explicit recognition of trade measures for environmental purposes may 
actually be driven by disguised economic objectives.  
Protectionism is especially conspicuous to Members who believe that 
―greening‖ the WTO is inappropriate because the WTO is not an 
environmental organization and ―cannot claim any expertise in solving‖ 
environmental problems.
79
 These states complain that the implementation 
of measures such as financial and technical assistance, capacity building, 
and technology transfer on favorable terms to developing countries has 
been tardy, even though they have been incorporated in many multilateral 
agreements to implement principles such as ―common and differentiated 
responsibilities‖ and ―special and differential treatment.‖ 80 In light of this, 
even if proposals for the integration of MEAs with the WTO seem to work 
in their favor, many developing countries feel that they have not yet 
reaped the anticipated benefits of joining the WTO and that the situation 
may not change if MEAs are given force in the WTO. Hence, they argue 
that environmental requirements—even those included in the MEAs—
would only become non-tariff barriers used by powerful states as 
disguised restrictions on international trade.
81
 
 
 
 77. World Trade Organization, TRIPS Council, The Relationship between the TRIPS Agreement 
and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge: 
Technical Observations on the United States Submission IP/C/W449 by Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, 
Cuba, India and Pakistan, ¶ 2, IP/C/W/459 (Nov. 18, 2005). 
 78. Rubens Ricupero, Trade and Environment: Strengthening Complementarities and Reducing 
Conflicts, in TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE MILLENNIUM 25 (Gary P. Sampson & W. Bradnee 
Chambers eds., 2001). 
 79. Santarius et al., supra note 38, at 18. 
 80. See U.N. Env. Prog. [UNEP], Developing Responses to Factors Inhibiting Implementation 
and Enforcement of Multilateral Environment Agreements: Background Paper 14 (UNEP High-Level 
Meeting Envisioning the Next Steps for Compliance with and Enforcement of Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements, Sri Lanka, Jan. 21–22, 2006) (Despite ―the evident needs and claims of 
the least developed countries,‖ acceptance of ―the need for distributive justice in sharing the burdens 
of international society [in the enforcement of MEAs] has been slow in coming.‖). 
 81. See Jenny Bates, Backgrounder: Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the World 
Trade Organization, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INSTITUTE, Oct. 1, 1999), http://www.ppionline.org/ppi_ 
ci.cfm?knlgAreaID=108&subsecID=128&contentID=777 (―Most developing countries oppose 
[exemption of MEAs from WTO challenge], seeing it as a way for developed countries to use 
environmental regulations as disguised protectionism.‖). 
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The Third World Network, a group of organizations and individuals 
involved in third world interest areas, sums up the objections against the 
proposals:  
The major proponents are seeking to bring non-trade issues 
[environment and labor standards] into the WTO not because this 
would strengthen the trade system, but because the WTO has a 
strong enforcement mechanism . . . . [I]f developing countries are 
members to agreements lodged in the WTO, there is the strong 
possibility of their compliance.
82
  
According to the Network, if non-trade issues are brought into the 
WTO, developing countries will be at a serious disadvantage because they 
would ―lose a great deal of their policy flexibility and the ability to make 
national policies of their own.‖83  
As reflected in the previous discussion, there are widely differing 
approaches to dealing with the relationship between MEAs and WTO 
rules, and, specifically, how trade measures for environmental purposes 
are to be addressed in the WTO. It is difficult and beyond the scope of this 
Article to comprehensively assess the merits and faults of the approaches 
and country positions. Nevertheless, an understanding of the approaches to 
the treatment of unilateral trade measures in the WTO requires such an 
evaluation, at a minimum, to a limited degree. Therefore, the following 
discussion critically evaluates the proposals in the WTO with regard to 
their clarification of the status of environmentally motivated unilateral 
trade measures. 
V. CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE EXISTING APPROACHES  
The first and most important point is that, with respect to scope, most 
of the proposals focus on trade measures arising from MEAs only. This 
restricts the trade-environment debate to a narrow subset of the wider 
issue—that is, as explained above, the legality of unilateral trade measures 
in the trading system, whether arising from MEAs or non-MEAs, solely 
based on a state‘s own criteria as prescribed by its domestic legislation.  
Even with respect to trade measures arising from MEAs, the proposals 
and discussions focus on those applied between MEA parties. The issue of 
trade measures by or against non-parties to MEAs, which raised serious 
uncertainties in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (―DSB‖) on several 
 
 
 82. Third World Network, supra note 72, at 2. 
 83. Id. 
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occasions, dropped out of the post-Doha discussions and negotiations.
84
 It 
is difficult to conceive of any issue within the ambit of the Doha agenda 
likely to be taken to the WTO because the major MEAs now in force, 
including the Montreal Protocol, the Basel Convention, the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(―CITES‖), the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic 
Tunas (―ICCAT‖), and the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources (―CCAMLR‖), will most likely address such 
issues within their own frameworks.
85
 Greater uncertainty exists over trade 
measures imposed single-handedly by a WTO Member (i.e., not in 
accordance with an MEA) and over the party/non-party relationship in 
trade measures arising from MEAs. Both of these issues, however, are 
excluded from the Doha mandate. 
The Doha Declaration explicitly excludes the MEA non-party issue 
from the negotiating agenda, and paragraph 31(i) stipulates that 
discussions and negotiations are to be ―limited in scope to the applicability 
of such existing WTO rules as among parties to the MEA in question.‖86 
This approach is in line with that of earlier GATT Panels that excluded, 
for example, CITES from consideration in a number of cases, such as 
Tuna-Dolphin, ―because GATT members were not all parties to the 
MEA.‖87 Moreover, this approach is consistent with the principle of public 
international law that a treaty cannot create obligations for a third state 
without its consent.
88
 Recent WTO cases, however, have seen a different 
approach. In the Shrimp-Turtle case, the Panels paid particular attention to 
MEAs, including CITES and the CBD, in deciding how to interpret the 
 
 
 84. The relationship between MEAs that incorporate trade restrictive measures (such as the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (―CITES‖)) and 
the WTO rules remain uncertain. Although general principles of public international law provide that 
where two treaties address the same subject matter, the latter treaty should be given preference, this 
rule does not apply to a non-party to either treaty. See Robyn Eckersley, The Big Chill: The WTO and 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements, GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., May 2004, at 24, 30; The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 30(3), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna 
Convention].  
 85. These MEAs have a relatively wide membership and hence, disputes that may arise will 
likely be dealt with within the MEA‘s well-developed compliance and dispute settlement systems. The 
MEA framework is also capable of addressing disputes involving other issues such as the questions of 
jurisdiction or conflict of laws. 
 86. Doha Declaration, supra note 5, ¶ 31(i), 41 I.L.M. at 751. 
 87. DUNCAN BRACK & KEVIN GREY, THE ROYAL INST. OF INT‘L AFFAIRS MULTILATERAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO 31 (2003), available at http://www.chathamhouse.org. 
uk/files/3125_meas_and_wto.pdf. 
 88. Id.  
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GATT article XX exceptions in disputes involving non-parties to the 
MEAs.
89
 
The EU‘s proposals, as well as the Doha mandate, by dwelling 
exclusively on the issue of trade measures arising from MEAs and the 
relationship between MEAs and WTO rules in general, fail to address the 
real problem in the WTO. While it is generally accepted that trade 
measures pursuant to MEAs create a potential for conflict, many states 
insist that there is already a ―broad scope for applying trade measures in a 
WTO-consistent manner‖ within the realm of the MEAs themselves.90 In 
addition to the benefits that accrue from ―good neighbourhood, Win-Win 
possibilities, such as increased trade in environmental goods and services 
and the harmonisation of technical standards, are often mentioned as 
positive features of the MEA-trade relationship.‖91 It is also significant to 
note that all environmental measures challenged in the WTO to date have 
been unilaterally imposed rather than required under an MEA.
92
  
As a result, the Doha mandate and the proposals initiated therefrom 
have mostly failed to address the crux of the environmental issues in the 
WTO—namely, the scope of permissibility of unilateral trade measures by 
or against non-parties to MEAs. The WTO Dispute Settlement Bodies 
have often been confronted with trade measures imposed unilaterally by 
Members and have continued to make decisions that, in one way or 
another, bear on the issues being discussed in the CTE. Hence, the 
negotiations and discussions are focused on the narrower agenda while the 
DSB continues to develop its own way of dealing with the problem in the 
wider context. In effect, this allows the DSB to assume a rule-making 
position, surpassing the judicial responsibility endowed to it under the 
WTO Understanding on Dispute Settlement.
93
 
 
 
 89. In this decision, the Appellate Body referred to sections of those MEAs that declared 
multilateral actions to be the most effective conservation measures. See Shrimp-Turtle case, supra note 
42. 
 90. MARKUS KNIGGE, REPORT ON TRADE AND MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 
4 (2005), available at http://www.ecologic.de/download/projekte/1800-1849/1800/3_1800_cate_meas. 
pdf.  
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Current debate as to the proper mandate of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body—rule-making 
or judicial—has been exacerbated by its greater reference to public international law and its increasing 
reliance on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as a guide to interpretation in its recent 
decisions. Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 4, art. 23, Legal 
Instruments—Results of Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226. See Joel P. Trachtman, 
The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 333, 335 (1999). 
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With regard to the proposal discussed earlier for retaining the status 
quo, the WTO jurisprudence by itself is a clear indication that unilateral 
trade measures are not welcome in the WTO system. The Appellate 
Body‘s recitation of a number of MEAs in justifying unilateral measures 
as well as the rejection of the U.S. measure in the Shrimp-Turtle and the 
Tuna-Dolphin
94
 cases by GATT and WTO Panels and the Appellate Body, 
albeit with some confusion and uncertainties, indicates that the door is 
shut on the free use of unilateral trade measures under the article XX 
exceptions as proposed by the United States. After all, it is the U.S. 
measure in the Tuna-Dolphin case, guided by this approach, that instigated 
the negotiations and discussions on environmental matters in the WTO.  
As to the earlier discussed EU proposal, ―the problem is that even 
multilateral agreements are not necessarily protection against a WTO 
challenge of environmental measures by non-members.‖95 While it is 
generally accepted that some MEAs with a large membership may reflect 
an international consensus, it does not seem to be the case that all 
Members of the WTO will accept MEAs as legitimate litmus tests for 
determining the acceptability of trade measures imposed by other WTO 
Members. The major WTO power, the United States, is not yet party to 
many such MEAs, and even some parties to MEAs are hostile towards the 
idea that an MEA can be used to justify measures in a trade forum such as 
the WTO.  
Moreover, consideration of an amendment to, or an understanding on, 
the MEA-WTO relationships brings to the debate a whole different set of 
issues, such as what criteria should be used to define an MEA and whether 
it is the role of the WTO to decide these criteria.
96
 Leaving aside such 
complications, an amendment as proposed by the European Union could 
be based on the NAFTA approach, accepting certain MEAs while leaving 
the status of future MEAs open pending a new paragraph to be added to 
article XX.
97
 That paragraph would refer to the relationship to trade 
measures taken pursuant to MEAs or newly created agreements on trade-
related environmental measures.
98
 However, as amendments require a two-
thirds majority, any amendment of WTO rules is not likely in the 
 
 
 94. Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Complaint by Mexico), GATT 
Doc.DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin case]. 
 95. Sir Leon Brittan, Keynote Address at the High Level Symposium on Trade and the 
Environment (March 15–18, 1999), transcript reprinted in ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW 336 (2002). 
 96. Shaw & Schwartz, supra note 36, at 149. 
 97. See supra note 43.  
 98. MEAs and WTO Rules Proposals, supra note 51, at 6–7. 
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foreseeable future.
99
 Developing countries, which constitute the majority 
in the WTO, do not support the EU proposal of exemptions to trade 
measures in MEAs because such a decision would affect their access to 
developed countries‘ markets.100 
Most developing countries opposed proposals clarifying the place of 
environmentally motivated trade measures in the WTO and initially 
opposed even the EMIT group‘s convening because environmental issues 
fell ―outside the WTO‘s competence.‖101 However, they did not hesitate to 
wield environmental arguments to limit other countries‘ exports after the 
CTE was formed. For example, African states asserted that the WTO 
should restrict the export of waste materials and domestically prohibited 
goods to protect the African environment and health.
102
 The United States 
has countered these claims by arguing that these issues are more 
appropriately addressed in other international environmental fora and not 
in the WTO.
103
 Other developing countries and economies in transition, 
led by India, have pressed for changes in the TRIPS Agreement to limit 
patent rights, create ―farmer rights,‖ and recognize ―indigenous 
knowledge‖ in order to promote environmental interests incorporated in 
the CBD.
104
 In turn, the United States responded that ―the WTO was not 
an environmental organization and it lacked the competence to insert MEA 
goals in WTO Agreements.‖105  
As correctly understood by Gregory Shaffer, what mattered in the CTE 
debates and the positions of the Member countries was not the consistency 
of a state‘s arguments on the WTO‘s competence to address environmental 
issues, but the specific state objectives at stake, i.e., its economic 
interest.
106
 States have argued about the WTO‘s limited competence only 
when they believed that environmental arguments prejudiced their 
economic interests. In this sense, as correctly expressed by Shaffer, states 
 
 
 99. AARON COSBEY, INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN ENVIRONMENTALLY 
SOUND TRADE EXPANSION: A REVIEW OF THE GLOBAL STATE OF AFFAIRS 11 (2000). 
 100. Shaw & Schwartz, supra note 36, at 152. 
 101. KOFI OTENG KUFUOR, WORLD TRADE GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE 
GATT/WTO CODE COMMITTEE SYSTEM 46 (2004). 
 102. Egypt, for example, argued that ―commercial interests should not prevail over the protection 
of human, animal or plant life or health.‖ Comm. on Trade & Env., Report of the Meeting Held on 16 
February 1995, ¶ 5, WT/CTE/M/1 (Mar. 6, 1995) [hereinafter Feb. 1995 Meeting Report]. 
 103. See Comm. on Trade & Env., Report of the Meeting Held on 14 December 1995, ¶ 32 
WT/CTE/M/6 (Jan. 17, 1996) (containing the United States‘ position that other agreements ―had the 
competence and expertise‖ to address these items, unlike the WTO). 
 104. See Shaffer, supra note 67, at 91. 
 105. Comm. on Trade & Env., Report of the Meeting Held on 11–13 September 1996, ¶ 39, 
WT/CTE/M/12 (Oct. 21, 1996). 
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made ―dollars and cents of the trade and environment linkage before this 
dollars and cents‖ organization.107  
This suggests that the stumbling block in the discussions and 
negotiations on trade measures in the WTO may be neither a concern with 
the impropriety of linking environmental objectives with trade policies (on 
the part of developing countries), nor altruistic environmental objectives 
(as contended by the United States), but rather the economic cost involved 
in complying with the environmental requirements. Some of the states 
with large markets, such as the United States, want to reduce the cost 
differentials arising from lower environmental and labor standards in the 
developing countries by raising the bar for environmental standards for 
exports from such countries. It seems that the developing countries oppose 
this not because of an insensitivity to environmental concerns, but rather 
because of the economic encumbrance involved in building capacity in the 
relevant legal, administrative, and technical areas to comply with the 
standards. For example, in imposing trade measures in the Shrimp-Turtle 
case, the United States effectively attempted to level the playing field by 
forcing its competitors to adopt similar, more expensive, fishing 
technology.
108
 In this sense, the use of environmentally motivated trade 
measures is heavily influenced by the economic implications of such 
measures. 
Though the economic cost involved in the imposition of unilateral trade 
measures is of critical importance in shaping the proposals for and against 
trade measures for environmental purposes and in determining the 
acceptability of unilateral trade measures, the proposals submitted to the 
CTE so far have not responded to this issue. As John Cuddy, former 
Director of the Division of International Trade at the UNCTAD, stated, a 
full understanding of the economic and developmental implications of the 
use of trade measures is important for ensuring their acceptability and 
effectiveness.
109
 These proposals so far do not assess the economic 
capabilities of Member states to respond to environmental challenges in 
the form of trade measures. In this regard, significant input from the Doha 
Declaration‘s other items, such as the reduction of environmentally 
destructive subsidies, is conveniently neglected.
110
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As a result, it seems that protectionism is a justified suspicion on the 
part of the developing countries. In particular, the recognition of trade 
measures in the manner proposed by the United States, i.e., the possibility 
of a WTO Member imposing trade measures unilaterally, makes 
environmental measures susceptible to serving as a means for disguised 
economic protection.  
It is ―true that developing countries dependant on agricultural exports 
are generally far more vulnerable to severe environmental disruptions than 
industrial countries that usually can switch agricultural suppliers quite 
easily.‖111 Due to the global nature of these environmental disruptions, the 
industrialized world has a responsibility to contribute to a comprehensive 
effort aimed at improving developing countries‘ trading positions, 
especially when the developing countries‘ export supplies are encumbered 
due to measures taken for environmental purposes.
112
  
The ―principles and criteria approach‖ seems to remedy some of the 
shortcomings of the other approaches. It provides definitive guidance on 
some of the complicated issues of MEA accommodation, such as non-
party status and specific trade obligations. The ―principles and criteria 
approach‖ would assist WTO Panels and the Appellate Body in assessing 
unilateral trade measures not included in MEAs, and may also help MEA 
negotiators contemplating the drafting of trade measures. Furthermore, the 
approach contributes to greater predictability in the system and 
―minimizes the grey area between legitimate MEA measures and ones that 
unnecessarily disrupt trade.‖113 
However, this approach also has its drawbacks. To mention one, the 
approach puts decision-making on the MEA-trade relationship in the 
hands of the WTO Dispute Settlement Bodies. While this may draw 
attention to the particular context of the trade measures‘ application, 
assigning this mandate to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body may have 
negative repercussions in light of the skepticism raised as to the neutrality 
 
 
¶ 13, 41 I.L.M. at 748. Environmentally destructive subsidies are subsidies by governments of 
industrialized countries to finance activities that environmentalists deem environmentally destructive. 
Examples include subsidies for global fishing fleets, national and multinational logging companies, 
and other environmentally destructive activities. See Urs P. Thomas, Trade and the Environment: 
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ENVTL. POL., Aug. 2004, at 9, 18. Though discussions on such subsidies were made part of the 
negotiation agenda at the Doha Declaration, the debate on trade measures is ―held hostage‖ to other 
negotiations, and stalled until the debate is over. Id. 
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of the DSB by both environmentalists and the developing countries, which 
often lodge accusations of judicial activism.
114
 
Although the ―principles and criteria approach‖ assists MEA 
negotiators when crafting specific trade obligations and informs trade 
partners of the type and scope of measures acceptable in the WTO, its 
retrospective effect ―raises additional concern since its application to 
previously agreed MEAs may limit their effect. The ability to amend pre-
existing MEAs, necessitating the reopening of the text, to suit the 
principles and criteria would be nearly impossible.‖115 Therefore, this 
approach may be somewhat ineffective insofar as the application of trade 
measures in existing MEAs is concerned.  
Despite the many proposals and the intense discussions and 
negotiations carried out since the establishment of the CTE and the launch 
of the Doha agenda, WTO Members have not yet succeeded in 
formulating criteria for clarifying the issue of environmentally motivated 
unilateral trade measures. It is in the interest of all WTO Members to 
negotiate a clear understanding of the interaction between the two legal 
regimes and, in particular, a clarification of unilateral trade measures. The 
divergence in outlook on unilateral trade measures, the wide variations in 
the form and content of the proposals addressing the issue, and the intense 
altercations on other items in the trade and environment agenda all serve to 
indicate that a realization of the Doha Development Agenda is unlikely in 
the near future. 
VI. POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE TRADE AND 
ENVIRONMENT CONFLICT  
Despite the drawbacks discussed earlier, there is still some hope for a 
better integration of the trade and environment regimes through the 
clarification of the status of unilateral trade measures for environmental 
purposes. The adoption of the Doha Declaration and the initiation of 
discussions in the CTE are significant, as these mark the first multilateral 
attempt—and demonstrate the general will of WTO Members—to 
negotiate particular aspects of the trade-environment relationship and, 
specifically, the fate of environmentally motivated unilateral trade 
 
 
 114. There are also other accusations levelled against the WTO‘s Dispute Settlement procedures, 
such as that they are not well suited for the developing countries‘ participation, that they do not accept 
unsolicited submissions from NGOs, and third party status questions. See generally, Marco 
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measures. These steps will help in advancing the much needed mutually 
supportive behavior between the two regimes by injecting substantively 
concrete terms that outline the relationship between the rules governing 
trade and the environment.  
Whereas the earlier debate was characterized largely by fears of major 
contradictions between trade and environment policies, the post-Rio 
debate and the consequent agenda in the CTE have focused on exploring 
the scope of complementarities between trade liberalization, economic 
development, and environmental protection.
116
 Moreover, the issue has 
recently become much more participatory as it has attracted the attention 
of a very large range of stakeholders, including different government 
ministries, NGOs, the business community, and academic institutions in 
both industrialized and developing countries.
117
 This paves the way for 
knowledge-based and constructive proposals, instead of proposals guided 
by competitive short-term national interests.  
The ongoing dialogue between the MEA secretariats and the CTE plays 
a useful role in enhancing mutual confidence and understanding between 
the two regimes and improves the interaction between trade, the 
environment, and development considerations.
118
 This, in turn, plays a key 
role in preserving the interests of developing countries, as some MEAs are 
specifically aimed at addressing the concerns of developing countries. 
Additionally, the recognition by the WTO Appellate Body that WTO 
agreements cannot be interpreted in isolation from international law is 
significant in resolving the complicated relationship between 
environmental policies and WTO rules.  
Within this context, many developing countries are ―fully committed to 
both trade liberalization and enhanced environmental protection.‖119 
Although developing countries tended to lift their objections to 
environmentally motivated trade measures and even sometimes favored 
their application,
120
 they urge that their application should be guided by 
principles that are negotiated among countries and not through unilateral 
action by a single, powerful nation.
121
 Their complaint against the United 
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States‘ unilateral measure in the Shrimp-Turtle case, for example, was that 
the United States, before imposing the ban, had not raised the issue in the 
CITES conferences, had not signed the Convention on the Conservation of 
Migratory Species or the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, nor had it ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity—all 
possible avenues for multilateral action for the protection of endangered 
species.
122
 This approach is encouraging when compared to the previous 
sharp opposition to any discussion on environmental issues in the WTO. 
VII. CONCLUSION  
WTO Members‘ understanding of the legality and acceptability of 
unilateral trade measures in the WTO is widely divergent. While some 
states construe the rules as allowing them to conduct their own 
environmental policy without being barred by trade restrictions,
123
 others 
consider such measures as a mere façade for protectionism and a vehicle 
for green imperialism.
124
 Still other states, mainly within the EU, interpret 
the rules as allowing MEAs to serve as a litmus test for the legality of such 
measures. Similar measures did not raise much concern in the 1970s 
primarily because they were few in number and trade-related effects of 
environmental measures were not as politicized as they are today.
125
 What 
should be questioned, therefore, is whether the specific methods adopted 
for environmental protection are taken with just this goal in mind.  
Demanding that developing countries adopt stringent, costly, and 
inappropriate environmental standards or risk import bans on shipments of 
goods to developed countries will only punish the technologically 
disadvantaged developing countries‘ producers and may defeat the original 
purposes for such a demand. As indicated above, one of the most 
important grounds of controversy concerning unilateral trade measures 
relates to their effectiveness in achieving their purported objectives. 
Unilateral trade measures are deficient as environmental policies because 
they are likely to address only environmental concerns in the export 
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sector, ignoring the damage occurring in the majority of economic sectors 
of the state against which the measure is applied.
126
 Coupling unilateral 
trade measures with positive measures will forestall the discordance of 
such measures with trade policies and will ensure that they effectively 
achieve stated purposes.
127
  
The effectiveness of unilateral trade measures as practiced so far—
strict enforcement of which sometimes amounting to green 
protectionism—depends on the relative market power of the importing and 
exporting countries.
128
 In practice, this policy instrument is only available 
to WTO members with substantial markets, i.e., developed and fast-
developing countries. While, in theory, trade measures are available to all 
WTO members, the least developed countries will not be able to use them 
to great effect. As a result, only the environmental concerns and 
preferences of developed and fast-developing countries would have any 
chance of redress, and this redress would be achieved at the economic 
expense of the least-developed countries. The extension of differential 
treatment in the form of positive measures to developing and least-
developed countries, which are in weaker market positions to utilize such 
trade measures by themselves, may mitigate these ill effects.  
Accordingly, it is in the interest of all WTO Members, including 
developing countries, to arrive at a clear understanding on the permissible 
scope of unilateral trade measures in the WTO. Such an understanding 
would bring great rewards: clarity on the rules to be met, fairer 
competition between developing countries and developed countries, and 
stronger guarantees against unilateral action. If the WTO Members opt for 
the reopening of the GATT rules to achieve this, there will most likely be 
demands for change in a number of areas over which the Members are not 
yet ready to achieve consensus.  
In moving towards the reconciliation of the trade and environmental 
regimes through the regulation of unilateral trade measures, states should 
also recognize their ever-growing interdependence. It is important to note 
that trade barriers in the form of trade measures are important in 
restraining destructive environmental practices; however, these barriers 
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must not follow the old imperialist logic of the North imposing itself on 
the South. Accordingly, an adjustment in the form of positive measures 
should be made to offset the economic disruption that such measures may 
entail.  
As a rule, unilateral measures are inconsistent with the letter and the 
spirit of the WTO, which is founded on the principle of multilateralism 
and the consensus and cooperation that flow from it. Article 23 of the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (―DSU‖) explicitly prohibits members 
from invoking unilateral measures that are not based on the WTO dispute 
settlement procedures.
129
 In the specific circumstances of most developing 
countries—where poverty, not lack of will, is usually the root of 
environmental degradation
130—unilateral responses risk defeating the 
environmental objectives they seek to resolve. For example, some 
developing African countries have a keen interest in environmental 
protection due to a concern for their immense biodiversity.
131
 It may 
therefore be in their interest for WTO Members to be allowed to take 
unilateral trade measures for environmental purposes. However, how 
unilateral trade measures have been applied thus far raises a reasonable 
fear that this could be used as a protectionist device to legitimize 
inconsistent trade measures within the WTO.  
Unilateral trade measures may be better suited to certain fields over 
others, if only because of the objectives pursued. For example, the 
Appellate Body‘s decision in the Shrimp-Turtle case on the illegality of 
the United States‘ unilateral measure would have been unacceptable had 
the complaining WTO Member states obstinately refused to enter into a 
conservation agreement that was the only effective way to protect sea 
turtles from extinction.
132
 Therefore, instead of avoiding discussions about 
environmentally motivated unilateral trade measures and denying their 
utility in the system, members should, to the greatest extent possible, try to 
harness the legitimacy of such measures according to WTO rules.  
In this context, the plausible and realistic option for lessening the 
chilling effect of unilateral trade measures is to regulate their applicability 
by means of a Ministerial statement, which may have the effect of making 
official certain principles on the regulation of unilateral trade measures. 
 
 
 129. Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, supra 
note 93, Annex 4, art. 23. 
 130. Shaw & Schwartz, supra note 36, at 145. 
 131. Paul Gepts, Who Owns Biodiversity, and How Should the Owners Be Compensated?, 134 
PLANT PHYSIOLOGY 1295, 1297 (2004). 
 132. Bhagwati, supra note 75, at 495. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
456 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 9:427 
 
 
 
 
This will provide the WTO Appellate Body with specific guidelines on the 
interpretation of WTO rules while paving the way for a second stage of 
negotiations on the trade and environment agenda and the full realization 
of the Doha mandate. It is important that such guidelines allocate 
corresponding responsibilities to facilitate coordination amongst Member 
states for the common goal of environmental protection. This will have 
significance in guiding the actions of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
towards more certainty by stipulating the hoops to be jumped through 
before the application of unilateral trade measures.  
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss3/3
